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COMMENT

Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District:
Can Environmental Impact Analysis Preserve
Sustainable Development From the New
Reach of the Supreme Court’s Exactions
Jurisprudence?
PATRICK F. CARROLL*

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has raised the legal
standard for a municipality to use land use exactions for
sustainable development. Land use exactions frequent local
government affairs and occur when a government demands a
dedication of land or money in exchange for a municipal approval,
such as a permit.1 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management

* Patrick Carroll grew up in the Hudson Valley and is continuously inspired
by the natural beauty of its local environment. He graduated from the State
University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry where
he received a Bachelor of Science in Environmental Studies. Currently, Patrick
is a legal intern with the Pace Environmental Litigation Clinic, and upon his
graduation from Pace Law School this spring, he will be working with the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial
Department, as an Appellate Court Attorney. Patrick believes combating
human-induced global climate change and its attendant environmental injuries
is the most significant legal and policy challenge of our time. He hopes to
combine his passions for the environment and the law as an environmental
lawyer and play a role toward its resolution.
1. W. Andrew Gowder, Jr., Recent Developments in Exactions and Impact
Fees: Public Dedications Required of Private Land, 44 URB. LAW. 667, 676 (2012)
(discussing what constitutes a land use exaction).

336

1

7_CARROLL FINAL

2015]

8/24/2015 12:08 PM

KOONTZ V. ST. JOHNS

337

District2 found certain proposed government exactions for land
use permits as “demands” on the applicant3 and required a
“‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ between the property that the
government demands and the social costs of the applicant’s
proposal,” regardless of whether the exaction was a condition
precedent or a condition subsequent.4 Even without incurring a
“takings” for purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution,5 if government-imposed
exactions are found to be “[e]xtortionate demand[s],”6 this would
still “run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take
property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to
have property taken without just compensation.”7 Thus, if there
is no “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality,” the exaction
is an actionable “unconstitutional condition.”8 After Koontz, this
standard now applies even if an applicant has only been asked to
make payments to improve public land.9 However, this comment
argues that municipalities can use environmental impact review
to shield themselves from the threat of uncertain, broad, and
costly litigation during negotiations with developers.
Part II of this paper discusses the import of municipal
exactions to environmental stewardship and sustainable
development. Part III provides an overview of the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, which played a decisive
role in the Koontz case. Part IV centers around the majority and
dissenting opinions in Koontz, as well as the issues settled, and
those now raised, by the Court’s ruling. Part V analyzes the New
York State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) and
focuses on its procedural and substantive requirements.

2. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
3. Id. at 2598.
4. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
391 (1994) and Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
6. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2586.
7. Id. at 2586.
8. Id. at 2596 (“As in other unconstitutional conditions cases in which
someone refuses to cede a constitutional right in the face of coercive pressure,
the impermissible denial of a governmental benefit is a constitutionally
cognizable injury.”).
9. Id. at 2598.
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Comparative treatment is also given to the environmental review
statutes in the States of California and Washington. Part VI
concentrates on case illustrations that reveal how these statutes
satisfy the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, as extended by
Koontz. This Part focuses chiefly on SEQRA, but also explores
possible outcomes under its analogous state counterparts. Part
VII concludes with potential ramifications for local environmental
law and sustainable development.
II. EXACTIONS IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
A. Exactions in General
Land use exactions frequent municipal governance and occur
if the government demands an action, such as a dedication of land
or a payment of money, in exchange for an authorized approval.10
Exactions can help municipal governments attain certain
development strategies. For example, a municipality might not
have enough revenue to furnish necessary amenities to its
citizens without asking developers to share in the costs of
providing the services now required by their projects.11 Exactions
may be imposed in traditional or non-traditional forms, or
through impact fees.12 Traditional exactions usually require
developers to dedicate some property upon which the
development is intended for public facilities, such as a park, or to
pay an in-lieu-of fee if the site is unsuitable for a land

10. Gowder, supra note 1, at 676.
11. Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Mesa, 243 P.3d 610, 616-18
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a cultural facilities impact fee, legislatively
imposed by the City, was allowable to offset the impact of a subdivider’s
development, in part because it provided a beneficial use that the City would
have been unable to render to maintain the “current level of service” due to the
new development); Twin Lakes Dev. Co. v. Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 821, 823
(N.Y. 2003) (holding that a recreational fee “in lieu of” a dedication of real
property to be imposed on certain residential subdivisions could be used to
improve “existing facilities for active recreation [that were] severely limited and
[were] inadequate to accommodate the needs of its residents”).
12. JOHN R. NOLON & PATRICIA E. SALKIN, LAND USE IN A NUTSHELL 118-22
(2006).
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dedication.13 The payment is used solely to bolster the targeted
amenities.14 The main difference between a traditional exaction
and a non-traditional exaction is that the non-traditional form
may apply the benefit exacted to public lands outside the project
property.15 Each exaction must address a need created by the
developer’s project and must serve those directly benefiting from
that project, such as residents in a subdivision.16 An impact fee
assesses a cost on the project applicant for “off-site improvements
necessitated as a direct result of the proposed development.”17
While these fees raise revenue, they are not taxation tools, but,
due to their “fee” status, are mechanisms to regulate land use.18
Notably, impact fees can apply to all new developments, while
traditional and non-traditional exactions are generally imposed
on subdivisions, and whereas traditional exactions are usually
limited to funding amenities such as “open space, parks, and
infrastructure,” impact fees can apply to other improvements.19
B. Exactions in the Context of Sustainable
Development
Modern trends have encouraged sustainable land use
practices and capital infrastructure. It is a common practice to
preserve forests or wooded areas to achieve sustainability
objectives by ordinances that charge a developer a fee, instead of
a dedication of land, to support a “tree preservation fund” to
protect greenspaces.20 “Linkage fees” are also used to support
public transit systems to lower the vehicle miles traveled by
personal automobiles and thus, greenhouse gases that contribute

13. Id. at 119.
14. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277(4)(c) (McKinney 2013); NOLON & SALKIN, supra note
12, at 119.
15. NOLON & SALKIN, supra note 12, at 120.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 121.
18. Id. at 120-21.
19. Id.
20. Carl J. Circo, Should Owners and Developers of Low-Performance
Buildings Pay Impact or Mitigation Fees to Finance Green Building Incentive
Programs and Other Sustainable Development Initiatives?, 34 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 55, 103 (2009).
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to climate change.21 Such fees require a developer to bear a “fair
share” of the infrastructure costs necessary to support the new
development.22 Recent offshoots of the impact fee tool include
mitigation fee programs that require compensation for the
ecological harms of a development or that subsidize green
building programs to encourage sustainable design and
The difference between linkage fees and
construction.23
mitigation fees is that the former funds necessary capital
expenditures for community infrastructure, while mitigation fees
compensate for the social cost of a project through “environmental
cost accounting” systems.24 This method values the social costs of
greenhouse gas emissions or waste disposal and charges
conventional developers that amount to supply funds for
sustainable initiatives.25 The economic rationale for fee programs
is akin to that of wetlands mitigation programs already in use.26
Even if emission reduction objectives, such as energy-efficiency
improvements, were too costly for a developer, a conventional
project could continue if the municipality was paid a fee that
would be used in other sustainable proposals.27 Still, these fees
would likely be subject to the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine as expounded by Koontz, which, given the uncertainty in
the valuation of environmental benefits,28 may make its
heightened standard difficult to satisfy.29
III. OVERVIEW OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, incorporated
through
the
Fourteenth
Amendment,
underlies
the
environmental issues of Koontz.30 It provides, “nor shall private
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id. at 102.
34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. at 104-05.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 110-11.
Id. at 112.
See infra Part III.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
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property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”31
The government may not, by law or by permit, compel a person to
yield a constitutional right, such as “just compensation,” for a
governmental benefit that is too attenuated from the property in
question.32 As discussed above, if the government impermissibly
conditions a governmental benefit on the surrender of a
constitutional right, this creates a “constitutionally cognizable
injury.”33 Consequently, the government faces a potential suit for
monetary damages.34
When a “takings” has occurred, the
requisite remedy under the Fifth Amendment is “[j]ust
[c]ompensation.”35 Yet, the Court has refrained from imposing a
specific mode of relief if no “takings” has occurred.36 Koontz filed
suit under the laws of the State of Florida,37 where “monetary
damages” were an appropriate redress for a “final agency action
[that] is an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power
constituting a taking without just compensation.”38 The Court
believed the applicability of that statute to “an unconstitutional
conditions claim like the one at issue here [wa]s a question of
state law that the Florida Supreme Court did not address” and
thus, the Court declined to resolve it.39
31. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
32. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
33. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596.
34. Id. at 2597.
35. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. L.A. Cnty., 482
U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (“[W]here the government’s activities have already worked
a taking . . . no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.”).
36. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597 (“In cases where there is an excessive demand
but no taking, whether money damages are available is not a question of federal
constitutional law but of the cause of action—whether state or federal—on
which the landowner relies.”).
37. Id. at 2593.
38. FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2013).
39. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598 (“But we need not decide whether federal law
authorizes plaintiffs to recover damages for unconstitutional conditions claims
predicated on the Takings Clause because petitioner brought his claim under
state law. Florida law allows property owners to sue for damages whenever a
state agency’s action is an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power
constituting a taking without just compensation. Whether that provision covers
an unconstitutional conditions claim like the one at issue here is a question of
state law that the Florida Supreme Court did not address and on which we will
not opine.” (emphases retained) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). See
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A. General Formation of the Law Pre-Koontz
This legal subject has been defined by several Supreme Court
decisions, but the two most significant cases are Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, and Dolan v. City of Tigard.40
Nollan held that in the absence of an “essential nexus” between a
condition and the impact to be mitigated, the condition is not a
valid land use regulation, but is an extortionate demand and a
“takings.”41 The Dolan case further defined the test such that the
government must also prove a “rough proportionality” between
the exaction burdening the property and the impact of the desired
action by an “individualized determination.”42 The Nollan-Dolan
test was considered limited to the “special context of [land use]
exactions.”43
Arguably, this was thought to include only
dedications of real property, or at least five Supreme Court
justices supported that proposition.44
Additionally, these
dedications were thought to arise from adjudicative ad hoc
demands,45 as by an administrative body, rather than from broad
generally applicable legislative determinations.46 Koontz must be
understood against this legal backdrop.

St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, No. SC09–713, 2013 WL 5878147,
at *1 (Fla. Oct. 30, 2013) (remanding the case to the Fifth District Court of
Appeal for further proceedings consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision); infra note 95.
40. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987). These cases shifted the burden from the
landowner, as is generally the case for municipal actions under the rational
basis test, Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926), to
the government, and they raised the scrutiny required to pass muster. See
Dolan, 512 U.S. 374; see Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
41. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
42. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390-91.
43. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
702 (1999).
44. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
45. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 438 (Cal. 1996) (NollanDolan heightened scrutiny applies to adjudicatory demands that amount to
“land use ‘bargains’ . . . in which the local government conditions permit
approval for a given use on the owner’s surrender of benefits which purportedly
offset the impact of the proposed development . . . where the individual property
owner-developer seeks to negotiate approval of a planned development.”).
46. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384-85.
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IV. KOONTZ V. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER
MANAGEMENT DISTRICT47
A. The Majority’s Analysis
In 1972, Coy Koontz bought a 14.9-acre tract in the State of
Florida, but he did not seek to develop it until 1994.48 During
that time, Florida enacted two statutes, the Water Resources Act
of 1972 and the Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act, to
protect state waters.49 The Water Resources Act created water
districts across the state as well as regional authorities to
manage them, and required, among other things, that developers
who wished to “construct . . . in or across the waters of the state”
to obtain a permit.50 The management authority could “impose
such reasonable conditions on the permit as [were] necessary to
assure that construction w[ould] not be harmful to the water
resources of the district.”51 By 1984, Florida still faced a
wetlands crisis.52 Thus, it enacted the Warren S. Henderson
Wetlands Protection Act that required an additional permit to
“dredge or fill in, on, or over surface waters,” which could be
obtained by giving “reasonable assurance” that the work was “not
contrary to the public interest.”53 Consistent with the Wetlands
Protection Act, St. Johns River Water Management Authority
(“Authority”) required the creation, preservation, or enhancement
of wetlands elsewhere to mitigate the impacts of a permitted
project that developed wetlands in its jurisdiction.54
Koontz sought to develop 3.7-acres of wetlands, applied for
the permits, and offered an eleven-acre easement to the
Authority.55 The Authority suggested he limit development to
one acre and offer a 13.9-acre easement, or that he deed the
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2586.
Id. at 2591–92.
Id. at 2592.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2592–93.
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eleven acres, but also pay to improve public wetlands offsite.56
The offsite condition was not required, as the Authority indicated
it was open to comparable alternatives.57 Yet, Koontz claimed
this action was “an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police
power constituting a taking without just compensation.”58
The Supreme Court concluded that if a landowner valued a
permit more than any “just compensation” from a “takings”
caused by it, governments could force one to surrender this right
by conditioning permit approval on a transfer of private land for
public use.59 Still, the Court also stated that land dedications
were often used to offset environmental costs of development
otherwise imposed on the public.60 The Court opined the NollanDolan “nexus” and “rough proportionality” test balanced these
concerns.61 It turned to the two issues presented: 1) whether
Nollan-Dolan review applied to both conditions precedent and
conditions subsequent to permit approval;62 and 2) whether
monetary exactions were also subject to this heightened
scrutiny.63
With little dispute, the Court held that Nollan-Dolan applied
to permits subject to conditions subsequent or conditions
precedent.64 It found little difference in the application of the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine to cases when the
government approved a permit, but conditioned it on “the
applicant turn[ing] over property,” or when it rejected a permit
“because the applicant refuse[d] to do so.”65 Otherwise, an
impermissible condition could be imposed by manipulating the
permit language to state, ‘“denie[s] until’” instead of ‘“approve[s]
if.’”66

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2595.
Id.
See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595.
See id. at 2596.
Id.
Id. at 2595.
Id. at 2596.
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The second holding, however, raised serious questions
regarding land use permitting. As in Nollan and Dolan, the
Court stated that if the government had just demanded the land
outside the permitting process, it would have been a “takings.”67
The Authority, the Florida Supreme Court, and four Supreme
Court Justices, believed an option to pay for improvements, a
monetary exaction not akin to the dedications in Nollan and
Dolan, was not subject to “takings” analyses.68 The Koontz
majority distinguished the dissent’s use of Eastern Enterprises by
finding the duty to pay at bar “‘operate[d] upon . . . an identified
property interest’ by directing the owner of a particular piece of
property to make a monetary payment.”69 Since this fee was tied
to a “specific parcel,” this “direct link” compelled Nollan-Dolan
review.70 The Court determined that such demands to improve
public lands would “transfer an interest in property from the
landowner to the government” and would entail “a per se taking
similar to the taking of an easement or a lien.”71
B. The Dissenting Analysis
Eastern Enterprises seemed to limit Nollan-Dolan review to
demands for real property, requiring only a due process analysis
for monetary exactions.72
Nollan and Dolan were found

67. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598–99.
68. Id. at 2599.
69. Id. at 2599 (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)).
70. Id. at 2599–2600.
71. Id. at 2600.
72. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and
dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy’s opinion is controlling here since the
decision resulted in a plurality opinion with him concurring on the narrowest
grounds in result, but not in rationale. Id. at 539. If “no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,
193 (1977) (citations omitted). Justice Kennedy opined that a “takings” analysis
was improper for exactions that “do[] not operate upon or alter an identified
property interest” and believed monetary exactions need only satisfy a due
process analysis. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540, 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment and dissenting in part).
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applicable only in the “special context of [land use] exactions,”73
and, before Koontz, appeared limited to administrative agency
demands for dedications of real property.74 Indeed, there were
five Justices in Eastern Enterprises who thought an analogous fee
was a due process issue.75 Arguably, Nollan and Dolan should
not apply beyond this special niche.
The dissent would not extend Nollan-Dolan review to
monetary exactions,76 noting that the government’s action would
have been a per se “takings” outside the permitting process in
Nollan and in Dolan.77 Yet, in Eastern Enterprises, Justice
Kennedy’s controlling opinion found that a broad duty to pay,
without specifying how it was to be met or upon what property it
was to be used, was not a “takings.”78 Justice Breyer’s fourJustice dissent agreed that a demand for a “‘specific interest in
physical or intellectual property’ or ‘a specific, separately
identifiable fund of money,’” causes a “takings,” but “‘an ordinary
liability to pay money’” does not.79 A general condition to pay for
the repair of public wetlands would seem broad enough to avoid a
Nollan-Dolan “takings” analysis. The dissent faulted the
majority’s analogy to a lien, as there was no appropriation of “an
income stream from a parcel of land,” that affected a “‘specific and
identified . . . property right,’” since Koontz had broad discretion
in financing the fee.80
C. Questions Settled
Koontz arguably raised more issues than it resolved, but it
also provided some answers for later land use exaction cases.
First, municipalities can still impose conditions on land-use

73. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
702 (1999).
74. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384–85 (1994).
75. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 558 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2605 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 2603.
79. Id. at 2605 (quoting E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 554–55 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
80. Id. at 2606 (quoting E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in judgment and dissenting in part)).
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permits; Nollan-Dolan review extends to more of them, now
applying to conditions subsequent and conditions precedent.81
Second, government demands for fees to be used for public
benefit, from any source, cannot be conditionally imposed by
permit unless the Nollan-Dolan test is met.82 Third, while the
prior standard for monetary exactions was met because the
challenger proved the action to be unreasonable,83 by imposing
Nollan-Dolan scrutiny, Koontz shifted the burden of satisfying
this standard to the government.84 Lastly, although it is unclear
if Koontz extends Nollan-Dolan review to generally applicable
legislative exactions,85 administrative ad hoc exactions,
unequivocally, must satisfy the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine.86
D. Possible Repercussions
While these ascertainable outcomes are likely to cause
unease for municipalities, the decision’s unresolved issues may
further discourage local officials from pursuing sustainable
initiatives to mitigate the harm of development projects. Instead,
localities may simply refrain from allowing a project to move
forward despite its benefits to the community if properly planned.
Officials may also find the cost of imposing sustainable exaction
measures too great in light of the heightened litigation risk,
thereby missing the opportunity to integrate economic
development with socially and environmentally beneficial goals.

81. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596 (majority opinion).
82. Id. at 2600.
83. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926) (holding
zoning laws that are a valid exercise of the police power as constitutional).
84. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599.
85. Id. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting). See Powell v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 166
Cal. Rptr. 3d 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (Refraining to reach the trial court’s
conclusion “that the Nollan/Dolan analysis applies only to discretionary,
adjudicatory impositions of exaction conditions, not to exactions applied to all
similarly situated property owners on an identical, nondiscretionary basis by
legislative enactment.”).
86. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603.
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1. A “Demand” by Government to Trigger NollanDolan Review
Koontz obscured the certainty municipalities rely upon in
using permit fees for land use regulation.87 While the Court
found a demand was made upon Koontz, he was never required to
cede specific property or to engage in specific mitigation.88 The
Court seemed to assume the Authority’s action created an
“extortionate demand,” and it declined to suggest how concrete a
demand must be to trigger Nollan-Dolan review.89 Koontz was
given options in meeting the permit criteria as well as in his
choice of funds for the payment, and the Authority was willing to
discuss comparable projects.90 Arguably, Koontz did not fail to
comply with an “extortionate demand or condition,” but rather, he
refused to act at all.91 If similar cases of recalcitrance arise in the
future, the dissent predicted local entities with “decent lawyer[s]”
would refuse mitigation guidance if it risks litigation.92 If so, the
permittee now stands in a greater position to leverage a
municipality into approving a project notwithstanding its
attendant ecological or social harms. Instead of mutually
beneficial negotiations, Koontz, as applied to equivocal conditions,
may incent outright permit approvals, regardless of the harm or
benefit likely to stem from the development, to avoid litigation
costs.93 While Koontz refrained from declaring that monetary
damages would always be the appropriate relief, since the remedy
here was to be ascertained from the state or federal cause of
action underlying the extortionate demand,94 the potential for
liability is both uncertain in substance and scope. Even if
monetary damages apply, if there is no actual “takings” the
87. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2609 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2593; cf. Powell v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747, 750,
753 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding the County’s action to inform the landowner’s
“counsel it would not approve the permit application without dedication of the
overflight easement” amounted to a “final, definitive decision . . . .”); see infra
note 101.
89. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598.
90. Id. at 2611 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2610.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2597 (majority opinion).
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remedy for the unconstitutional condition may prove elusive to
predict under any existing cause of action, thereby making it too
risky for a municipal attorney to counsel a client into offering a
mitigating condition.95
The point in time in which authorities may be subject to
Nollan-Dolan review during negotiations was also left
unsettled.96 Local authorities may be subject to suit early on in
the process because Koontz was allowed to sue, without giving a
counter proposal, after he found the initial proposals too
The Court also failed to indicate what
burdensome.97
administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to NollanDolan scrutiny.98 Two Justices on the Florida Supreme Court
would have held for the Authority since, in their view, Koontz had

95. On remand, the District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the lower
court’s ruling, holding that the Authority had worked an exactions taking by
unconstitutionally conditioning the permit and thus, Koontz deserved “just
compensation.” St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, No. 5D06-1116,
2014 WL 1703942, at *1-2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2014). The dissent made
a significant argument based on the Supreme Court’s distinction between
situations when a permit is denied but neither property nor money has been
taken, and when a “taking” is actually incurred:
Because there was no “taking” compensable under the Fifth
Amendment in this case, the question remains whether Koontz has a
damages remedy under section 373.617, Florida Statutes. That
statute, however, specifies that “damages” are available whenever a
state agency’s action is an “unreasonable exercise of the state’s police
power constituting a taking without just compensation.” Unless the
language of the Florida statute is considered to be broad enough to
authorize the payment of damages for a “taking without just
compensation” even though there was no “taking” for Fifth
Amendment purposes, Koontz simply has no claim . . . In what legal
universe could a law authorizing damages only for a “taking” also
provide damages when (as all agree) no taking has occurred? I doubt
that inside-out, upside-down universe is the State of Florida.
Certainly, none of the Florida courts in this case suggested that the
majority’s hypothesized remedy actually exists; rather, the trial and
appellate courts imposed a damages remedy on the mistaken theory
that there had been a taking (although of exactly what neither was
clear).
Id. at *4-5 (Griffin, J., dissenting). See infra note 99 (discussing the cause of
action under the Floridian statute).
96. See generally Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610–11 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2593 (majority opinion).
98. Id. at 2597.
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not exhausted his administrative remedies.99 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to “second-guess a State Supreme
Court’s treatment of its own procedural law.”100 As a practical
matter, the point at which there is an affirmative imposition of an
impermissible condition, and an affirmative denial there from,
may be murky at best, which suggests that even initial municipal
mitigation guidance could induce the requisite “extortionate
demand.”101
99. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1231–32
(Fla. 2011) (Polston, J., concurring in result). “[A]n attack on the propriety of
[an] agency action” should first be pursued in accordance with Chapter 120 of
the Florida Statutes, before a “takings” action is to brought under Section
317.617 of the Florida Statutes. Id. Section 317.617(2) requires claims of an
“unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking without
just compensation” to be brought before a trial court. FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2)
(2013). Yet, the Authority argued that while an exaction claim is a takings
claim, nothing was exacted here, and so it was truly a claim on the merits of the
permit. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8, 10–11 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2009), decision quashed, 77 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2011), rev’d, 133 S.
Ct. 2586 (2013). When the question is whether the permit was “in accordance
with existing statutes or rules and based on competent substantial evidence,”
under Chapter 120, the claimant must follow Florida’s Administrative
Procedure Act for judicial review, and the claim must be brought “in the
appellate district.” FLA. STAT. §§ 373.617(2), 120.68 (2013). Since Koontz
brought his case before the trial court, it was alleged that he did not follow the
proper administrative process. Koontz, 5 So. 3d at 10–11. However, the appellate
district believed the Authority was actually arguing that there could be no
exaction claim when a “land owner refuses to agree to an improper request from
the government resulting in the denial of the permit.” Id. at 11. The appellate
district, while acknowledging the “ongoing debate” over this position, relied on
Dolan to illustrate an instance where permit conditions were refused and yet
the exaction claim was reached. Id. It concluded that Dolan’s dissent addressed
this stance and so, while not taken up by the majority, it was “implicitly rejected
by the majority.” Id. Unfortunately for the Authority, the U.S. Supreme Court,
while refusing to interpret the intricacies of the Florida statutes, held that if a
landowner refuses an impermissible condition precedent to the issuance of a
permit, this has the same exaction effect as a condition subsequent. Koontz, 133
S. Ct. at 2595–96. Thus, it is not likely that any difference between the
procedural laws amongst the three States analyzed here, would provide a
municipal entity, using the same argument as the Authority, with any
additional support.
100. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597.
101. For a recent application of Koontz in this respect, see Powell v. County of
Humboldt, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747 (Ct. App. 2014). After the County of Humboldt
required the Powells to dedicate an “overflight” easement over their property as
a condition to the approval of a building permit, the Powells protested that this
condition was unconstitutional. Id. The County responded to the Powells’
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Holding a proposed, but not yet required, condition as a
“demand,” where the landowner could give alternatives to a
government’s proposals, seems contrary to the Court’s
articulation of judicial ripeness for a “takings.” A unanimous
Court has held that “a Fifth Amendment claim is premature until
it is clear that the Government has both taken property and
denied just compensation.”102 When a plaintiff did “not s[eek]
‘compensation through the procedures the State ha[d] provided
for doing so,’” the claim was not ripe.103 Arguably, Koontz’s
inaction during negotiations was not a good faith effort to comply
with an authorized permitting process, and it is debatable
whether his challenge was ripe. Even so, the Koontz Court did not
address this consideration. Thus, municipalities are left with
vague impressions as to when the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine may be applied against them.
2. The Scope of Application
Without a clear notion as to the new extent of Nollan-Dolan
scrutiny, the dissent may be right to conclude this “new rule now
casts a cloud on every decision by every local government to
require a person seeking a permit to pay or spend money.”104
Many local permit fees, often used to mitigate “traffic or
pollution—or [the] destruction of wetlands,” or to pay for services,
such as wastewater treatment, must now pass a heightened
review.105 Even the majority recognized that “internaliz[ing] the
negative externalities of [landowner] conduct is a hallmark of

counsel, stating that it would not approve the permit without the easement. Id.
“The Powells took no further administrative action, such as obtaining a denial of
the application, seeking a variance, or taking an appeal from an adverse ruling
on the permit or variance application to the County’s board of supervisors
(“Board”).” Id. (emphasis added). The Court found that this “correspondence . . .
sufficiently established a final, definitive decision by the County that no permit
would be issued without the easement. No more was required to satisfy the
ripeness requirement. Any doubt on this score was removed by . . . Koontz . . ..”
Id.
102. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 (2013).
103. Id. (citing Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985)).
104. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 2607.
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responsible land-use policy, and [the Court] ha[s] long sustained
such regulations against constitutional attack.”106 Thus, the
dissent offered several limits to Koontz. For instance, Dolan was
limited to adjudicative decisions as to one parcel and did not
involve a broad legislative plan.107 Yet, the Court did not decide
whether Koontz was applicable to adjudicative exactions alone, or
whether it extended to general legislative fees imposed on entire
jurisdictions.108
Justice Thomas had previously declared that “takings”
analyses should not differ based on whether a decision was
adjudicative, as by a planning commission, rather than
legislative, as by a city council.109 While recognizing a split
amongst the lower courts, he noted several state jurisdictions
that imposed Nollan-Dolan scrutiny in such cases.110 Still, if the
issue was directed to the Court, it is likely to hold otherwise as
the Dolan majority emphasized that its use of the “rough
proportionality” test was in the context of an adjudication, and
set this apart from the legislative judgments upheld under the
state police powers in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty.111
In addition, the Court denied a writ of certiorari when the
California Supreme Court held that “monetary exactions [were]
more like zoning restrictions,” and have been “accorded
substantial judicial deference.”112 In Ehrlich v. City of Culver
City, Ehrlich gained approval to develop a “private tennis club
and recreational facility” and in accordance with this approval,
the city amended its zoning and general plan ordinances to
106. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (majority opinion).
107. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
108. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600 n.2 (“[B]ecause the proposed offsite mitigation
obligation in this case was tied to a particular parcel of land, this case does not
implicate the question whether monetary exactions must be tied to a particular
parcel of land in order to constitute a taking.”). See id. at 2608 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
109. Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1118 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (denying certiorari from a decision where a broadly
applicable ordinance was a valid use of state police powers).
110. Id. at 1117.
111. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8 (1994) (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)). See also Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387.
112. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 454–55 (Cal. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 929 (1996).
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accommodate the use.113 However, Ehrlich closed the facility
several years later and applied for a rezoning and a general plan
amendment to allow him to build a “condominium complex valued
at $10 million.”114 After performing a feasibility study, the city
discovered it did not have the funds to buy and operate the
facility, but still decided to deny Ehrlich’s application due to the
“loss of a recreational land use needed by the community.”115
After several discussions with Ehrlich, the city reconsidered and
decided to approve his application, but required that he pay
monetary exactions.116 One fee was “‘for additional [public]
recreational facilities as directed by the City Council,’” and
another fee fell under an “‘art in public places’” ordinance to be
paid into the “city art fund.”117 Ehrlich had contended the fees
were unconstitutional takings without just compensation.118 A
plurality opinion resulted however, and a concurrence reasoned
that “general governmental fees” do not implicate Nollan-Dolan
review, but under “takings” analyses, require the ad hoc
determination of whether the imposition was arbitrary under the
Court’s well-recognized balancing of factors.119 Furthermore, the

113. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 433–34.
114. Id. at 434.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 434–35.
117. Id. at 435.
118. Id.
119. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 457–58. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries, the Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have
particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too,
is the character of the governmental action.”). See also San Remo Hotel L.P. v.
City & Cnty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002) (“The ‘sine qua non’ for
application of Nollan/Dolan scrutiny is thus the ‘discretionary deployment of
the police power’ in ‘the imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases.’
Only ‘individualized development fees warrant a type of review akin to the
conditional conveyances at issue in Nollan and Dolan.’ . . . We decline plaintiffs’
invitation to extend heightened takings scrutiny to all development fees,
adhering instead to the distinction . . . between ad hoc exactions and
legislatively mandated, formulaic mitigation fees. While legislatively mandated
fees do present some danger of improper leveraging, such generally applicable
legislation is subject to the ordinary restraints of the democratic political
process. . . . Ad hoc individual monetary exactions deserve special judicial
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Washington Supreme Court, in City of Olympia v. Drebick, cited
this concurrence in its decision that “legislatively prescribed
development fees” were not subject to Nollan-Dolan review.120
While Koontz failed to determine this issue, there is some
authority to suggest general legislatively imposed fees are not
subject to Nollan-Dolan review.121
V. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF KOONTZ FOR
ACTIONS INVOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT ANALYSIS
If
local officials wish to encourage sustainable
development,122 it may be necessary to impose remedial
conditions to mitigate destructive developmental impacts.123
However, Koontz forces municipal officials to navigate potentially
litigious posturing to achieve such objectives.124 Thus, a means
to provide some certainty in the permitting process would likely
reduce the apprehension felt by engaging such laudable goals.
Moreover, if such a mechanism could also shield against the

scrutiny mainly because, affecting fewer citizens and evading systematic
assessment, they are more likely to escape such political controls.” (citations
omitted)).
120. City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 808 (Wash. 2006) (en banc). See
Alto Eldorado P’ship v. Cnty. of Santa Fe, 634 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011)
(“The developers’ claim in this case does not fall within Nollan and Dolan for
this reason alone: the regulatory action amounts to a restriction on how the
developers may use their land should they choose to subdivide it or, in the
alternative, the imposition of a fee.” (footnote omitted)).
121. But see George B. Speir, Will Koontz Mean Big Changes or Business as
Usual for Real Estate Development in California?, 24 no. 1 MILLER & STARR,
REAL EST. NEWSALERT, Sept. 2013, at 10-1 (“However, it is not clear whether the
distinction drawn in Ehrlich between legislatively formulated development
assessments imposed on a broad class of property owners, which would be
judged under the lesser rational relationship standard, and exactions imposed
on a specific project on an individual and discretionary basis, which would be
subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, is still a legitimate distinction.”).
122. Sustainable development has been defined as “development . . . [that is]
adequate to meet the needs of the present without compromising the needs of
future generations.” John R. Nolon, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 36 REAL
EST. L.J. 351, 355 (2007). Sustainable practices include the present preservation
of open space to allow future generations to foster from its benefits. Id.
123. Id. at 368–70, 373.
124. See discussion supra Part III.
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threat of litigation under the Nollan-Dolan test, the municipal
exaction would better retain its continued vitality as a tool to
achieve societal goods.
At least one possible solution to the uncertainty wrought by
Koontz exists in the form of the environmental impact review
process. After a brief overview of several SEQRA provisions, a
comparison will be made between SEQRA and two similar
statutes. Several case illustrations will then be presented in
support of the proposition that environmental impact analyses
can evince a rough proportionality and essential nexus between
the exaction and the property burdened. Thus, municipalities
may be able to use environmental impact review findings as a
shield from the threat of uncertain, and potentially costly,
litigation during negotiations with developers.
In 1970, the federal government passed the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to require federal agencies that
engage in “major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment” to evaluate the environmental
impacts of their action and its alternatives.125 If a proposed
action is significant enough, the analysis must include a detailed
report, known as an environmental impact statement (EIS), early
on in the decision-making process to address environmental
considerations.126 About half the states enacted similar state
environmental review legislation, but only a handful of those
apply to local government agency actions.127 The New York
SEQRA, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), and
the State of Washington’s State Environmental Policy Act
(SEPA)128 are among those that govern local agency actions.129
The U.S. Supreme Court has held NEPA to be a procedural

125. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2012).
126. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.1 (2014).
127. JOHN R. NOLON & PATRICIA E. SALKIN, LAND USE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1109 (8th ed. 2012).
128. To be clear, these types of statutes are often referred to as state
environmental policy acts because they are considered, “mini-NEPAs.” Dean B.
Suagee & Patrick A. Parenteau, Fashioning a Comprehensive Environmental
Review Code for Tribal Governments: Institutions and Processes, 21 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 297, 299 (1997).
129. NOLON & SALKIN, supra note 127, at 1109.
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statute, with little substantive force.130 Where NEPA fails to
offer substantive means to mitigate development impacts, these
three state statutes do not.131
A. New York State’s State Environmental Quality
Review Act (SEQRA)
SEQRA’s purpose was to mandate state, regional, and local
government agencies to engage themselves with the
environmental issues involved in their decision-making and
planning activities.132 It requires that “all agencies determine
whether the actions they directly undertake, fund, or approve
may have a significant impact on the environment, and, if it is
determined that the action may have a significant adverse
impact, prepare or request an [EIS].”133 Moreover, “consistent
with social, economic and other essential considerations from
among the reasonable alternatives available, the action [must be]
one that avoids or minimizes adverse environmental impacts to
the maximum extent practicable” through mitigation.134 SEQRA
covers many state and local agencies, due to its broad definition
of “Agency” as “any state or local agency,” and its definition of
“local agency” as “any local agency, board, district, commission or
governing body, including any city, county, and other political
subdivision of the state.”135

130. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)
(“Although these procedures are almost certain to affect the agency’s
substantive decision, it is now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate
particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.”).
131. Id. at 352 (“There is a fundamental distinction, however, between a
requirement that mitigation be discussed in sufficient detail to ensure that
environmental consequences have been fairly evaluated, on the one hand, and a
substantive requirement that a complete mitigation plan be actually formulated
and adopted, on the other.”); Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National
Environmental Policy Act: Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA’s Progeny,
16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 254 (1992).
132. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.1(c) (2014).
133. Id. § 617.1(c).
134. Id. § 617.11(d)(5).
135. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(2), (3) (McKinney 2014).
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1. Procedural Requirements - The Preparation of
an EIS
An EIS contains the following sections: 1) the proposed action
and its environmental circumstances; 2) the short-term and longterm environmental effects of the action; 3) the expected adverse
environmental impacts if the proposed action was executed; 4)
alternatives to that action; 5) irreversible or irretrievable
resources that would be used or lost if the action was undertaken;
6) mitigation measures to ameliorate environmental impacts; 7)
any significant growth-inducing consequences of the action; 8)
any significant energy demands; and 9) other information
consistent with SEQRA and its guidelines.136
This detailed analysis functions to determine whether or not
the proposed action should be undertaken by “incorporat[ing] the
consideration of environmental factors into the existing planning,
review and decision-making processes of state, regional and local
government agencies at the earliest possible time.”137 Given its
comprehensive scope, it is no small wonder that the EIS has been
considered “the heart of SEQRA.”138 Still, SEQRA pervades state
and local agency decision-making even if there is no significant
effect on the environment to analyze.139
The lead agency is “principally responsible for undertaking,
funding or approving an action[,] . . . for determining whether an
environmental impact statement is required in connection with
the action, and for the preparation and filing of the statement if
one is required.”140
Before determining the environmental
significance of the action, the lead agency may be required to
complete an Environmental Assessment Form (EAF), which is “a
form used by an agency to assist it in determining the

136. MICHAEL B. GERRARD ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REVIEW IN NEW YORK
§ 1.03 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2014), available at LexisNexis.
137. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.1(c) (2014).
138. Jackson v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.E.2d 429, 435 (N.Y. 1986).
139. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(2) (McKinney 2014). This provision
requires an EIS for all agency actions that “may” have a significant effect on the
environment, a determination that may require using an EAF. N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.7(b)(3) (2014).
140. Id. § 617.2(u).
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environmental significance or non-significance of actions.”141 An
EAF must “describe the proposed action, its location, its purpose
and its potential impacts on the environment.”142 While an
exhaustive review of the factors and procedures used in
developing an EAF are beyond the scope of this paper, a basic
synopsis will illustrate its importance.
First, an EAF requires an outline of the specific factual
circumstances of the proposed action, such as environmental and
physical site considerations, and the particular aspects of the
proposed action itself.143 Secondly, this information is used to
“evaluat[e] the proposed action . . . to ascertain its probable
environmental effects and consequences.”144 Notably, the model
EAF was recently revised to consider modern environmental
concerns of proposed actions, such as greenhouse gas
emissions,145 and became effective on October 7, 2013.146
If a lead agency finds “no adverse environmental impacts or
that the identified adverse environmental impacts will not be
significant,” no EIS is required, the agency makes a
determination of no significance, and the SEQRA process
concludes.147 If the “action may include the potential for at least
one significant adverse environmental impact,” the lead agency
makes a determination of significance, closes the environmental
assessment phase, and begins an EIS.148 Yet, some actions that
could cause adverse significant impacts may not require a full
EIS, if appropriately mitigated, as described below.149

141. Id. § 617.2(m).
142. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.7(m).
143. GERRARD, ET AL., supra note 136, § 3.04.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the SEQR Environmental
Assessment Forms, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
http://www.dec.ny.gov/permits/93240.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
147. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.7(a)(2); GERRARD, ET AL., supra
note 136, § 3.05.
148. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.7(a)(1).
149. Id. § 617.7(d) (discussing when an action that may cause significant
adverse environmental impacts may receive a conditioned negative declaration
due to the imposition of SEQRA mitigation conditions).
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There are three action varieties that an agency may confront:
Type I, Type II, and Unlisted actions.150 Type I actions are “more
likely to require preparation of an EIS than Unlisted actions,”151
while Type II actions “have been determined not to have a
significant impact on the environment or are otherwise precluded
from environmental review under Environmental Conservation
Law, article 8.”152 Unlisted actions are just that, “all actions not
identified as a Type I or Type II action [under the SEQRA
regulations], or, in the case of a particular agency action, not
identified as a Type I or Type II action in the agency’s own
[SEQRA] procedures.”153 A conditioned negative declaration
(CND) is a negative declaration of significance that may be issued
for an Unlisted action, even if it is likely to cause an adverse
significant environmental impact, if mitigation conditions ensure
no such impact will occur.154
In the context of an adjudicatory hearing, the aforesaid
process creates a record from which a court assesses the agency
action under a “substantial evidence” review.155 This standard
requires there be “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,”156 and if so,
“the courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the
agency for it is not their role to ‘weigh the desirability of any
action or [to] choose among alternatives.’”157 The case law also
150. Id. § 617.2(ai)-(ak).
151. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.4(a).
152. Id. § 617.5(a).
153. Id. § 617.2(ak).
154. Id. § 617.2(h). A CND is applicable to “Unlisted actions” that may have an
adverse significant environmental impact, but, due to the imposition of
mitigation measures, no such impact will occur. Id. § 617.2(ak). While this
substantive measure is laudable, its application is subject to Nollan-Dolan
review. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586; GERRARD ET AL., supra note 136, § 6.04. Thus, if
a SEQRA condition does not have a “rough proportionality” and “essential
nexus” “to the state’s interest in protecting the environment from the threat
posed by the landowner’s proposed project,” it will likely be declared invalid. Id.
§ 6.04(3).
155. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803(4) (McKinney 2013); 9 WEINBERG ET AL., N.Y.
PRACTICE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND REGULATION IN NEW YORK § 4:44 ¶ 13 (2d
ed. 2013), available at Westlaw.
156. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
157. Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479, 484 (N.Y. 1997) (quoting Akpan v.
Koch, 554 N.E.2d 53, 57 (N.Y. 1990)).
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suggests that agency findings in EAFs may evince the requisite
proportionality and nexus between the condition and the action’s
impacts.158
Under a “substantial evidence” standard, such
findings would be granted deference.
2. Substantive Requirements
SEQRA not only mandates a procedural consideration of
environmental impacts, but it also requires choosing alternative
actions and mitigation “to the maximum extent practicable, [to]
minimize or avoid adverse environmental effects, including
effects revealed in the environmental impact statement
process.”159
“[U]nlike its Federal counterpart and model,
[NEPA], . . . SEQRA is not merely a disclosure statute; it ‘imposes
far more action-forcing or substantive requirements on state and
local decision makers than NEPA imposes on their federal
counterparts.’”160 Thus, SEQRA regulations allow agencies to
“impose substantive conditions” after completing a final EIS or a
CND to ensure satisfaction of this statutory command.161
SEQRA independently grants the power to require mitigation as
a condition of approval that is different in its enabling
mechanism than the traditional conditioning authority used by
municipalities under their police powers.162

158. Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 821, 825 (N.Y.
2003); Grogan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of E. Hampton, 633 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810
(App. Div. 1995).
159. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1) (McKinney 2014).
160. Jackson v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.E.2d 429, 434 (N.Y. 1986)
(quoting Philip H. Gitlen, The Substantive Impact of the SEQRA, 46 ALB. L.
REV. 1241, 1248 (1982)).
161. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.3(b) (2014).
162. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1), (2)(f); N.Y. TOWN LAW §
276(4)(e) (McKinney 2013). See also Morse v. Gardiner Planning Bd., 563
N.Y.S.2d 922 (App. Div. 1990); NOLON & SALKIN, supra note 127, at 1110.
SEQRA provides that
[a]gencies shall use all practicable means to realize the policies and
goals set forth in this article, and shall act and choose alternatives
which, consistent with social, economic and other essential
considerations, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize or
avoid adverse environmental effects, including effects revealed in the
environmental impact statement process.
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In addition, the New York Court of Appeals has set forth a
two-prong test to discern whether a negative declaration has been
impermissibly conditioned.163
If “the project, as initially
proposed, might result in the identification of one or more
‘significant adverse environmental effects’ . . . [and] proposed
mitigating measures . . . were ‘identified and required by the lead
agency’ as a condition precedent to the issuance of the negative
declaration,” then the negative declaration has been
impermissibly conditioned.164 Importantly, the court elaborated
on the second prong, finding that the measures must be made as
“part of an open and deliberative process . . . [such that the]
mitigating measures could be viewed as part of the ‘give and take’
of the application process.”165 The court applied this test in
Merson v. McNally, where a planning board addressed noise and
mining activities it deemed significant.166 However, open and
deliberative discussions with the developer quelled these
concerns through mitigation conditions.167
The developer
achieved compliance with the zoning code’s noise provision and
conformed to the planning board’s stipulation that Saturday
activities would only entail the sale of materials.168
The
developer also agreed to the planning board’s proposals for traffic
mitigation, and adjusted its activities to avoid an

N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1). Moreover, SEQRA also requires that the
EIS “shall include a detailed statement setting forth . . . mitigation measures
proposed to minimize the environmental impact.” Id. § 8-0109(2)(f). This
authority is distinct from municipal police powers that allow a municipality to
engage in conditional zoning, where the municipality may consent to the
exercise of its zoning authority, but unilaterally conditioned on the project
applicant’s agreement to perform reasonable actions designed to protect
neighboring property owners and the character of the community as a whole
from the effect of the project. Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680, 682 (N.Y.
1960). In fact, unilaterally imposed conditions are deemed impermissible
mitigation measures under SEQRA, Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479, 486
(N.Y. 1997), and this stance appears congruent with the prohibited use of
extortionate demands under the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine. See
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603.
163. Merson, 688 N.E.2d at 484.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 484–85.
166. Id. at 485.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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environmentally sensitive aquifer area.169 The court held that
since the conditions were not “unilaterally imposed by the lead
agency, but essentially were adjustments incorporated by the
project sponsor to mitigate the concerns” of the public and other
agencies, the negative declaration was not impermissibly
conditioned.170
New York courts have recognized that conditions are
permissible when they are not unilaterally imposed but are
brought about through open and deliberate processes.171
Moreover, this view appears consistent with the language in
Koontz. The Koontz majority believed the Authority imposed
extortionate demands,172 but declined to offer guidance as to
when a “demand” might be “indefinite,” leaving that decision to
the Florida Supreme Court on remand.173 Arguably, conditions
not “unilaterally imposed by the lead agency, but [that]
essentially were adjustments incorporated by the project sponsor
to mitigate the concerns” of the public and the reviewing
agencies,174 would not be so extortionate as to trigger NollanDolan review. Thus, monetary exactions akin to those in
Koontz,175 when requested in an open and deliberative manner,
supported by environmental impact review materials, public

169. Merson, 688 N.E.2d at 485–86.
170. Id. at 486.
171. Thorne v. Millbrook Planning Bd., 920 N.Y.S.2d 369, 371 (App. Div.
2011), leave to appeal denied, 954 N.E.2d 1182 (N.Y. 2011) (“The modifications
may not be conditions unilaterally imposed by the lead agency, but adjustments
incorporated by the project sponsor to mitigate concerns identified by the public
and the reviewing agencies, and be publicly evaluated prior to the issuance of
the negative declaration.”); Hoffman v. Town Bd. of Queensbury, 680 N.Y.S.2d
735, 737 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that where the Town Board took a “hard look”
at the environmental impacts in compliance with its SEQRA obligations,
engaged public hearings, and solicited public comment from the community as
well as involved agencies, its conditions were part of an open and deliberative
process and were permissible); Wilkinson v. Planning Bd. of Thompson, 680
N.Y.S.2d 710, 713 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that since issues arose through the
impact analysis and subsequent public comment and hearings, the CND was not
impermissible because the changes were simply adaptations by the applicant to
the concerns of the community and the reviewing agencies).
172. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603.
173. Id. at 2598.
174. Merson, 688 N.E.2d at 486.
175. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603.
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hearings, and input by affected parties and agencies, are more
likely to pass muster.
B. Comparison to the States of California and
Washington
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and
Washington’s State Environmental Protection Act (SEPA) share
similar qualities with SEQRA. Each governs the actions of local
government agencies as well as state agencies.176 Each also
requires an environmental impact analysis for actions that may
have a significant effect on the environment,177 an
Environmental Impact Report (EIR) under CEQA, and the
familiar EIS under SEPA.178 Moreover, all three statutes have
substantive requirements that can influence decision-making
processes above and beyond their procedural mechanisms.179
However, while SEQRA and CEQA require mitigation measures,
SEPA only permits their use.180
Under CEQA, “deferred mitigation measures,” measures
formulated at a later point in the review process, while usually
barred, are allowed if they are not “loose or open-ended.”181 This
prevents applicants from avoiding the statute’s mandate to
ensure impacts are not significant.182 When mitigation
“provide[s] for specific actions,” “set forth with . . . particularity,”
such as a buffer zone “no less than 22 acres” for an animal species
directly impacted by a project, this is not “loose and open-ended”

176. NOLON & SALKIN, supra note 127, at 1109. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
21001(a) (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060 (2013). Only six state
environmental review statutes, including California and Washington, govern
both local government and state actions in the United States. N OLON & SALKIN,
supra note 127, at 1109.
177. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.1(a) (West 2014); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 8-0109(2) (McKinney 2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030-43.21C.031 (2013).
178. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.1(a); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.031.
179. Ferester, supra note 131, at 230–31.
180. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.1(a); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1);
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060.
181. Save Panoche Valley v. San Benito Cnty., 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 737–38
(Ct. App. 2013).
182. Id. at 738 (citing Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto,
146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 12 (Ct. App. 2012)).
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and is permissible.183 The language requiring “particularity” and
“specificity” between a condition and a remedy seems analogous
to the spirit and rationale of Nollan-Dolan scrutiny, even if the
terminology is different.
CEQA also allows for fee-based conditions if there is evidence
that the fee will incur the necessary mitigation.184 In Save Our
Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Board of Supervisors,
an EIR concluded that a proposed residential development would
greatly add to traffic and congestion issues.185 The county board
conditioned approval of the project on the payment of a traffic
mitigation fee to avoid halting regional development.186 The fee
was intended for street improvements consistent with a Master
Plan.187 The Court of Appeal for the Sixth District of California
reviewed the EIR and found the “traffic impact mitigation fees
were sufficiently tied to the actual mitigation of the impacts of
increased traffic[,] . . . the EIR’s discussion of traffic mitigation
measures was adequate and the Board’s adoption of the
conditions of approval was supported by the evidence.”188
Save Our Peninsula Committee indicates that courts will give
deference to decisions consistent with well-performed EIRs
supported by requisite evidence.189 Here, the court relied upon
the record formed by the EIR to find that the fee condition was
“sufficiently tied” to the development impacts.190 Again, while
this is not the Nollan-Dolan language as expounded by Koontz, it
suggests that in determining the relationship between a condition
and an impact, reliance on the EIR would nevertheless be
appropriate under the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine.
The authority of local agencies to condition approvals on
mitigation measures under SEPA appears more limited. SEPA
183. Id.
184. Save Our Peninsula Comm. v. Monterey Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 104
Cal. Rptr. 2d 326, 356 (Ct. App. 2001).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 352–53.
187. Id. at 353.
188. Id. at 356.
189. See id. at 342–43 (“Determinations in an EIR must be upheld if they are
supported by substantial evidence.” (citing Barthelemy v. Chino Basin Mun.
Water Dist., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688, 694 (Ct. App. 1995))).
190. Save Our Peninsula Comm., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 357.
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provides that an applicable “action may be conditioned only to
mitigate specific adverse environmental impacts which are
identified in the environmental documents prepared under this
chapter.”191 The conditions must also be “based upon policies
identified by the appropriate governmental authority and
incorporated into regulations, plans, or codes,” and be “reasonable
and capable of being accomplished.”192 This language has been
interpreted quite literally. In Prisk v. City of Poulsbo, the Second
Division of the Court of Appeals of Washington found there to be
no environmental policy within the city’s jurisdiction to support a
fee to be used for park resources as a condition for subdivision
approval.193 Without an otherwise stated policy within the city
code, the city could not use SEPA to circumvent the illegitimacy
of a fee that was deemed an unauthorized tax.194 Yet, without
even reaching the issue of whether a sufficient policy basis was
present to support certain proposed conditions, the Washington
Supreme Court has found it sufficient to affirm the issuance of a
building permit by relying on an impact analysis, which failed to
show any need for mitigation.195
A more recent case indicates some flexibility within SEPA’s
mitigation provisions. In Brinnon Group v. Jefferson County,
Jefferson County “enacted an ordinance that amended its
comprehensive plan to permit the development of a master
planned resort.”196 The ordinance conditioned approval on thirty
items.197 The Brinnon Group sued for, among other things, the
fact that there was no policy basis to support each condition.198
The Court ruled that SEPA did not require a specific policy in
support of each condition, but rather it was permissible for the

191. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060 (2013).
192. Id.
193. Prisk v. City of Poulsbo, 732 P.2d 1013, 1018–19 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
194. Id.
195. Levine v. Jefferson Cnty., 807 P.2d 363, 366 (Wash. 1991) (relying on
Nagatani Bros. v. Skagit Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 739 P.2d 696, 699 (Wash. 1987)
(“SEPA mandates that [an] action is to be conditioned or denied only on the
basis of specific, proven significant environmental impacts . . . identified in a
final or supplemental EIS.”)).
196. Brinnon Grp. v. Jefferson Cnty., 245 P.3d 789, 793 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
197. Id. at 796.
198. Id. at 805.
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county to base its “written conditions on the general SEPA
policies.”199
The conditions imposed by local agencies under each statute
are subject to Koontz. Thus, it is important to determine how
these laws may reduce the uncertainty wrought by that decision.
Yet, the differences between the statutes may affect how
effectively each can shield their respective municipalities, under
an environmental impact analysis, from Koontz’s implications.
VI. SATISFYING KOONTZ AND THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
THROUGH THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW
PROCESS
The environmental impact analysis is a means of proving a
rough proportionality and an essential nexus between an exaction
and the property burdened. As such, municipalities in some
jurisdictions may resort to impact reports to shield themselves
from uncertain and costly litigious posturing by developers in
negotiations. This should encourage their continued pursuit of
sustainable development through mitigation conditions as well as
fees to fund “green” capital infrastructures. The following cases
illustrate how environmental impact reviews have satisfied the
Nollan-Dolan test, but also now have bearing on the monetary
exactions under Koontz.
A. Sudarsky v. City of New York200
In Sudarsky, property owners claimed their development was
unconstitutionally restricted after New York City amended the
City’s Zoning Resolution and therefore prevented them from
building their project.201 Plaintiffs sought to develop land located
in a “Special Transit Land Use District,” which was intended for
a “Second Avenue subway line.”202 If deemed necessary by the

199. Id. at 808.
200. Sudarsky v. City of New York, 779 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d,
969 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1084 (1993).
201. Id. at 291–93.
202. Id. at 291.
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Department of City Planning, the Zoning Resolution required the
conveyance of a transit easement by landowners developing
within this District to assist the subway project.203 Plaintiffs
claimed the Department of City Planning schemed to require a
transit easement on their property to delay the issuance of a
building permit until it could rezone the site to make their project
illegal.204 On the claim that the transit easement conditions
violated Nollan, the District Court found that the property
owners’ assertions would require the City “to undertake an
individualized inquiry such as an environmental impact study to
determine whether plaintiffs’ proposed development would have
any effect on street congestion or subway use.”205 The District
Court found that “the federal constitution does not require the
City to undertake the type of detailed study that plaintiffs argue
is necessary,” and found Nollan’s nexus analysis to be satisfied
through less scrutinizing determinations.206
This is a notable construction of the “essential nexus”
element of Nollan-Dolan review. If the requisite nexus can be
satisfied without an environmental impact review, then it
suggests the more detailed SEQRA review can protect against
assertions of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine grounded
in the nexus component. The decision also provided foresight into
the “individualized determination” envisioned by Dolan, and may
infer that impact analyses can meet the “rough proportionality”
requirement.207 In addition, here, a federal court interpreted a
land use decision and its impacts on the applicant. The U.S.
Supreme Court has stated that “state courts undoubtedly have
more experience than federal courts . . . in resolving the complex
factual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning and landuse regulations.”208 While this statement was made in the
context of determining the competence of state courts and federal
courts to hear such issues,209 it acknowledged the well-known

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Sudarsky, 779 F. Supp. at 291.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 347 (2005).
Id.
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primacy of state law over land use issues. Thus, it was proper for
Sudarsky to rely on a New York Court of Appeals decision, Jenad,
Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, “cited approvingly in Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm’n[,]” to determine if the nexus asserted
by the City was sufficient.210 The next case affirmatively
indicates SEQRA’s value in satisfying the “rough proportionality”
requirement.
B. Grogan v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of East
Hampton211
This case directly evinces how the SEQRA process may be
interpreted to satisfy the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine. A
negative conservation easement, which limits the grantor’s use of
the property without providing the grantee any use rights,212 was
imposed as a condition for the Zoning Board of Appeals to
approve construction of an addition to a house.213 The import of
this case was not so much the court’s finding of a rough
proportionality between the easement and the environmental
impacts of the project,214 but instead how it used the
“environmental assessment form prepared by the Town of East
Hampton Planning Department,” as offering determinative
evidence to support this conclusion.215 While the petitioners
argued that a no-develop conservation easement was arbitrary
and capricious and an unconstitutional taking of its property, the
Second Judicial Department put great weight on the fact that the
“[EAF] . . . discusse[d] the specific environmental impacts of the
proposed construction and the best manner by which to
ameliorate them.”216 The court concluded that this was evidence
of “a valid, individualized determination that the easement [wa]s

210. Sudarsky, 779 F. Supp. at 299.
211. Grogan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of E. Hampton, 633 N.Y.S.2d 809 (App.
Div. 1995).
212. JAMES W. ELY, JR. & JON W. BRUCE, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN
LAND § 12:2 (2014), available at Westlaw.
213. Grogan, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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an appropriate measure to address the specific environmental
impacts of the petitioners’ proposal.”217
Grogan illustrates that a properly completed EAF can suffice
to show the conditions imposed are connected to the impacts of
the proposed action and are proportional in scope to meet the
Nollan-Dolan test. It makes no difference that subsequent
decisions have held that Grogan should not have applied an
exactions analysis to a negative conservation easement.218 While
the New York Court of Appeals has now made clear that the
Nollan-Dolan inquiry only applies to dedications of real property
and to fees paid in-lieu-of a dedication,219 the indispensable
matter is that the Grogan court found it appropriate to defer to
an EAF to evince an essential nexus and rough proportionality.220
C. Twin Lakes Development Corp. v. Town of Monroe221
Twin Lakes indicates that the same deferential treatment to
municipal decision-making and to the imposition of conditions on
developers pursuant to impact analyses seen in Grogan, also
apply to fees in-lieu-of a dedication. Twin Lakes Development
Corporation applied to the Planning Board of the Town of Monroe
(Board) for approval to subdivide its property into twenty-two
residential lots.222 The Board reviewed the application under
SEQRA and decided to conduct a full-fledged EIS.223 After the
SEQRA process concluded, the Board adopted a “Resolution of
Conditional Final Approval” that approved the application, but
conditioned it on several demands; including payment of a fee for
community recreational purposes instead of a dedication of land
for such activities.224 Notably, the resolution cited Town Law
Section 277 for the authority to require such a condition under
217. Id.
218. Smith v. Town of Mendon, 771 N.Y.S.2d 781, aff’d, 822 N.E.2d 1214 (N.Y.
2004).
219. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State, 840 N.E.2d 68, 83 (N.Y. 2005).
220. Grogan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of E. Hampton, 633 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810
(App. Div. 1995).
221. Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 821 (N.Y. 2003).
222. Id. at 822.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 822–23.
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Monroe’s Code.225 Twin Lakes argued the fee did not have a
rough proportionality to the recreational needs that would be
created by its residential subdivision.226 The New York Court of
Appeals disagreed and not only found that the Nollan-Dolan test
was satisfied, but did so through the Board’s findings in the
EIS.227 This illustrates that even conditions not arising from
SEQRA authority can be supported by the SEQRA process.
Twin Lakes and Grogan suggest that an environmental
impact review constitutes an “individualized consideration of the
project’s impact [as] contemplated by Dolan v. City of Tigard.”228
While Dolan required “[n]o precise mathematical calculation,” it
obliged “some sort of individualized determination that the
required dedication [wa]s related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development.”229 Other jurisdictions are
in accord. In City of Olympia v. Drebick, the Washington Supreme
Court, in evaluating whether Nollan-Dolan review applied to
legislatively prescribed impact fees, discerned the “individualized
assessment” as the key analysis in Dolan.230 An environmental
impact review may very well fit this criterion.
D. California Environmental Quality Act and State
Environmental Policy Act
While SEQRA and its corresponding case law seem to be
powerful tools for municipalities to bolster themselves against
Koontz-related arguments in New York, CEQA and SEPA
represent similar shields to such assertions of Nollan-Dolan
scrutiny. In California, the conditional approval of a building
permit, requiring the dedication of land for street realignment in
a professional office use zone, was invalidated as having no

225. Id.
226. Twin Lakes Dev. Corp., 801 N.E.2d at 823.
227. Id. at 825.
228. Id.; Grogan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of E. Hampton, 633 N.Y.S.2d 809,
810 (App. Div. 1995) (By using the findings in the EAF, the court found “a valid,
individualized determination that the easement [wa]s an appropriate measure
to address the specific environmental impacts of the petitioners’ proposal.”
(emphasis added)).
229. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
230. City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 808 (Wash. 2006) (en banc).
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essential nexus to the project as a mitigation measure for traffic
impacts.231 The Court relied on the EIR to find “that the
conversion of the property would impose no significant traffic
problems in the area.”232 By negative implication, it may be
inferred that environmental review materials can be used to
prove an essential nexus between an exaction and the property
burdened. Yet, as here, when such necessary factual bases are
absent from an EIR, this may evince the absence of a nexus as
well.233
The “Guidelines for the Implementation of [CEQA]”
promulgated in the California Code also require that the
“Contents of [EIRs]” consider and discuss mitigation measures
under the constitutional principles set by Nollan, Dolan, and
Ehrlich v. City of Culver City.234 In essence, the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine was drafted into the regulations. If the EIR
discusses the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” of an
adjudicative mitigation condition and finds these constitutional
requirements satisfied in a nexus study, such a decision would
likely be given deference. An agency approval in an EIR will be
upheld if “‘supported by substantial evidence in the record.’”235
Substantial evidence is “enough relevant information and
reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument
can be made to support a conclusion, even though other
conclusions might also be reached.”236 “[T]he reviewing court
must resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative
finding and decision” and must not set aside an EIR mitigation
decision just because an alternative was just as or even more

231. Rohn v. City of Visalia, 263 Cal. Rptr. 319, 328 (Ct. App. 1989).
232. Rohn, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
233. See Levine v. Jefferson Cnty., 807 P.2d 363, 366 (Wash. 1991) (“The draft
EIS contained only a recommendation for minor traffic changes . . . and
comments by a neighbor expressing concern about traffic and flood levels.” The
court found that because “[t]his constituted the complete record upon which the
denial [of a permit] was based . . . the record d[id] not support attachment of the
mitigative restrictions.”).
234. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15126.4(a)–(b) (2014).
235. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d
278, 283 (Cal. 1988) (en banc) (citing CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 14, § 15091(b) (2014)).
236. CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 14, § 15384(a) (2014).
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reasonable.237 The court will only disturb an agency decision
under CEQA if “the agency [did] not proceed[] in a manner
required by law or if the determination or decision [was] not
supported by substantial evidence,” under an “abuse of
discretion” standard of review.238 Thus, if the lead agency can
prove the condition satisfies Nollan, Dolan, and Ehrlich within
its nexus study, this result would enjoy vast judicial deference, as
long as the “nexus” and “rough proportionality” findings are not
mere fabrications. This offers a strong deterrent to Koontz-type
confrontations, and may protect local sustainable development
initiatives if the appropriate studies are properly undertaken.239
The State of Washington offers additional examples of
environmental review safeguards. In dicta, a Washington
appellate court found that requiring access ramps on a freeway to
remedy a purported increase in traffic as a condition to construct
and operate a new asphalt plant did not satisfy the Nollan-Dolan
test.240 The court found this EIS inadequate and thus, the record
was insufficient to require a condition to mitigate traffic concerns,
at least without the completion of a supplemental EIS.241 This
case provides another inverse inference that the record can
237. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n, 764 P.2d at 293 (quoting Topanga
Ass’n for a Scenic Cmty. v. Cnty. of L.A., 522 P.2d 12, 16 (1974)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
238. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n, 764 P.2d at 283 (citing CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 21168.5 (West 2014)).
239. As discussed above, Koontz did not address whether Nollan-Dolan review
applies to generally applicable legislative fees. See supra notes 108, 119-21 and
accompanying text. This is important for California communities. While
administrative ad hoc monetary exactions have had to satisfy Nollan-Dolan
scrutiny since the Ehrlich decision, “most communities have adopted
development impact fees under the Mitigation Fee Act . . . [such as] across-theboard fees imposed on virtually all applications for development . . . [or] more
specialized fees . . . on certain types of development, or development within
certain geographic areas.” Speir, supra note 121, at 4. “These fees may have
been adopted as a result of an impact fee analysis which generally meets the
deferential ‘reasonable relationship’ standard of the Mitigation Fee Act.” Id.
Thus, if Koontz is interpreted as extending Nollan-Dolan review to general fee
ordinances, it is probable that some of these legislatively imposed fees will not
satisfy Nollan-Dolan’s heightened standard “when applied to the specific
circumstances of a particular property or development project.” Id.
240. Kiewit Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Clark Cnty., 920 P.2d 1207, 1209, 1213
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
241. Id. at 1209, 1213.

37

7_CARROLL FINAL

2015]

8/24/2015 12:08 PM

KOONTZ V. ST. JOHNS

373

support a rough proportionality and an essential nexus by
reference to environmental impact review procedures and
documents, as long as they are properly performed.
Washington’s mitigation fee statute allows “‘voluntary
agreements with [local governments] that allow a payment in lieu
of a dedication of land or to mitigate a direct impact that has been
identified as a consequence of a proposed development,
subdivision, or plat.’”242 However, it only provides a list of
requirements for the authorization of a mitigation payment, and
does not grant the power to impose them.243 The authority to
require such exactions must have some independent statutory
origin, and SEPA has been upheld as “one such source.”244 Given
the statutory synergy between SEPA and the mitigation fee
statute, it is important that the Nollan-Dolan test be satisfied
when imposing a mitigation fee even if the harm preexisted the
project under review.245 Thus, the EIS must make an adequate
“individualized determination” not only as to the unique harm
created by the project, but also of how the proposed action
exaggerates a “preexisting deficiency” for the mitigation payment
to be properly imposed.246 There is some indication that the
Washington courts would concur with Merson v. McNally,
242. City of Fed. Way v. Town & Cnty. Real Estate, LLC, 252 P.3d 382, 398
n.33 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 (2013)).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 396 (citing City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802 (Wash. 2006)
(en banc)).
245. Id. at 396 (referring to Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 49
P.3d 867 (Wash. 2002) (en banc)). In Isla Verde International Holdings, Inc., the
court upheld a condition to mitigate a deficiency that preexisted the proposed
development, but also held that the record did not support an open space
mitigation condition as a necessary requirement to mitigate development
impacts since there was a “determination of nonsignificance.” Isla Verde Int’l
Holdings, Inc., 49 P.3d at 878–79. While the court emphasized that the value of
this determination was “not dispositive” and “should not be overemphasized,” id.
at 879 n.15, the environmental impact analysis clearly played a role in the
court’s decision. This is another instance where it could be argued, by negative
inference, that SEPA findings can connect an impact and a condition, but that
the absence of such findings, as was the case here, may also indicate no such
relationship. It should be noted, however, that this case, while alluding to
“roughly proportional” language, seems to use “reasonably necessary” as its
standard. Id. at 878–79.
246. See City of Fed. Way, 252 P.3d at 399 (interpreting Isla Verde Int’l
Holdings, Inc., 49 P.3d at 879).
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regarding mitigation, on the import of “an open and deliberative
process” towards forming conditions.247 Conditions brought on by
comments of a concerned agency, as well as correspondences and
studies by the agency and the project sponsor,248 seemed to be
part of a review process “to mitigate the concerns” of the public
and other agencies and not “unilaterally imposed by the lead
agency” despite the project sponsor’s ultimate disapproval.249

VII. CONCLUSION
The value of municipal exactions, either through land
dedications or a fee in-lieu-of a dedication, cannot be overstated.
They pervade the governance of land use decisions faced by local
officials on a daily basis. Moreover, municipalities may use
mitigation conditions to replace existing conventional
development strategies and land use patterns with more
sustainable practices. This may occur in an environmental
context (i.e. open space preservation or by incentivizing green
development funds),250 economic context (i.e. traffic fees to
prevent the deterioration of infrastructure by funding repairs and
construction),251 and social context (i.e. recreational and cultural
facilities, or maintenance fees to protect such facilities in
existence).252 Yet, Koontz’s extension of Nollan-Dolan scrutiny to
monetary exactions, at least in the context of adjudicative ad hoc
decisions, as well as the uncertainty wrought by the majority’s
refusal to delineate the scope of its decision, may discourage such
tactics. Indeed, the Koontz dissent predicted that the majority
opinion would impede future land use decisions by stifling

247. Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479, 484-85 (N.Y. 1997).
248. City of Fed. Way, 252 P.3d at 386–87.
249. Merson, 688 N.E.2d at 486. See City of Fed. Way, 252 P.3d at 387.
250. See NOLON & SALKIN, supra note 12, at 118-22; Circo, supra note 20, at
108.
251. City of Fed. Way, 252 P.3d at 386–87; Save Our Peninsula Comm. v.
Monterey Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 326, 356 (Ct. App. 2001).
252. Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Mesa, 243 P.3d 610, 616,
618 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010); Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d
821, 822–23 (N.Y. 2003).
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negotiations and, in turn, causing rampant rejections of
development projects and mitigation guidance alike.253
The Koontz decision invited many environmental legal
scholars to consider alternative mechanisms to sustain the
viability of the land use exaction as a prominent tool for
municipal land use governance. While this comment has argued
what it believes to be the strongest of these methods, in light of
the fact that not every State has enacted such robust mini-NEPA
statutes, at least two other positions are worth mentioning: the
“development agreement,”254 and “contingency bargaining.”255
Nonetheless, this comment emphasizes that the state
environmental impact review process is a wide-ranging and
effective tool to protect against some of Koontz’s risks,256 and,

253. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
254. Development agreements are contracts negotiated between a municipal
authority and a developer that authorize the local entity to pursue
comprehensive planning by requiring improvements beyond what would be
allowed under its local code, and are statutorily authorized in thirteen states.
David L. Callies, Land Development Conditions After Koontz v. St. Johns River
Water Management District: Sic Semper Nexus and Proportionality, in SUPREME
COURT TAKINGS: A FIRST LOOK AT KOONTZ AND HORNE pt. 5, at 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n
et al. eds., 2013), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/cle/programs/
nosearch/materials/2013/t13sctcm1.pdf.
255. In the context of sea-level rise, there has been some acknowledgement
that “contingency bargaining,” or a form of “negotiated project review,” between
a developer and a municipal agency that “accommodate [for] disagreements
about future events,” and which contemplate “future costs” may satisfy or even
fall outside Koontz’s heightened scrutiny for monetary exactions. John R. Nolon,
Commentary, Sea Level Rise and the Legacy of Lucas: Planning for an Uncertain
Future, 66 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 22 (2014). Negotiated, “open and deliberative,”
and bilaterally constructed conditions seem to frequent the discussion over what
is or is not an “impermissible condition,” and infers that conditions produced by
a negotiated process will be less likely to face challenges under Nollan-Dolan
review. See Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479, 484–86 (N.Y. 1997).
256. Other scholars have also suggested that Koontz will influence, and can be
circumvented by, the environmental review statutes. See Robert H. Freilich &
Neil M. Popowitz, How Local Governments Can Resolve Koontz’s Prohibitions on
Ad Hoc Land Use Restrictions, 45 URB. LAW. 971, 985 (2013). Yet, this proposed
solution relies on the use of “tiering” the environmental review by engaging in a
large programmatic analysis of several actions that are related in a manner
contemplated by CEQA. Id. at 986. For example, tiering can be applied to
certain regional development plans that include “a sustainable communities
strategy” to mitigate air pollution caused by poor transportation planning. Id. at
986–87. These strategies are usually exempt from CEQA review or will only
undergo a restricted analysis. Id. The authors suggest that such a “[l]arge-scale
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where applicable, should be considered as one of the most
compelling instruments to preserve this vital function of local
government. The statutory provisions, corresponding regulations,
and case law in three states seem to indicate that the
requirements of some state environmental policy statutes can
shield against or even satisfy Nollan-Dolan litigation.257 Courts
often seek to avoid embroiling themselves in public policy
debates, given that such arguments are held primarily in the
legislative and executive branches of government. Yet, in a world
of scarce resources, sustainable development is irrefutably a
sound policy for our communities, states, and nation to aspire
towards. In fact, all three aforementioned state statutes evince a
legislative intent to protect and maintain the environment for
present and future generations, and to prevent the deterioration
of limited environmental resources from the effects of societal
expansion and development.258 This is not a mandate to halt all
development, but a directive that environmental considerations
be part of our decision-making due to their great value to human
civilization. It is logical that when municipal officials follow the
provisions of these statutes, conditions that develop through an
“open and deliberative process” envisioned by the sovereign
legislative authority of the respective states, and that consider
the environmental, economic, and social impacts of a proposed
action, would be granted deference. This analysis does not
propose that municipal authorities are completely immune from
Nollan-Dolan scrutiny under Koontz. Rather, the contention
asserted here maintains that the procedural and substantive

regulatory mechanism[]” is sufficiently dissimilar from “demand[s] directly tied
to . . . particular ownership of a particular piece of land” such that
municipalities could avoid Koontz altogether. Id. at 988 (footnote omitted). Still,
these authors concede that “[u]nfortunately . . . courts have determined that
only certain off-site issues can be deferred to later analysis and not just any
regional, county or city-wide analysis can be used for future individual project
EIRs.” 45 URB. LAW. 971, 987. If the environmental review process, and its
resulting impact statement, can in and of itself indicate the requisite nexus and
proportionality by way of an “individualized determination,” see supra Part VI,
there would be no need to side-step challenges grounded in Koontz because the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine could be directly satisfied.
257. See discussion supra Part V.
258. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West 2014); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 8-0103 (McKinney 2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020 (2013).
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provisions of these state environmental policy statutes and their
implementing regulations provide pillars of stabilization to
ensure local efforts, aggregated over the national sphere, toward
sustainable development do not collapse.
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